Analysis of the Concept of
and Justified Belief
epistemic luck -> justification ->gettier problem -> epistemic luck
Alternative: reliabilsm (Alvin Goldman)
output believes are justified if produced by a reliable process
[belief-dependent processes are reliable
if the output believes are usually true when the input
beliefs are true]
[belief-independent processes are reliable if the input beliefs are true]
later: causal theory
what is justified belief?
external: j-reliabilsm (which is j-external) [bonjour: clairvoyance Norman]
J-externalism: justification not directly recognizable
causal theory of externalism (beliefs have to be caused in the right way)
strong access internalism: features of beliefs that make beliefs
must be potentially accessible. - But this condition is too strong, either for foundationalism
as for coherentism.
mental state internalism
Chisholm: J-internalism: direct recognizable (S always recognizes when he has a
direct recognizablility of justifieres equiv. to direct recognizablitiy of justification
Internal justification is a necessary condition of knowledge. A belief's origin in a reliable cognitive process is not sufficient for its being an instance of knowledge.
Arguments for internalism:
role of justification
Internal justification is not a necessary condition of knowledge. A belief's origin in a reliable cognitive process is sufficient for its being an instance of knowledge. Consequently, there are cases of knowledge without internal justification.
Arguments for externalism
justified is evaluative term
without a reliability constraint, the connection between justification and truth becomes too tenuous
rules out belief-systems consisting of mostly justified, but false beliefs (evil deceiver)
animals have knowledge
knowledge (belief) rests on foundation of noninferential knowledge (beliefs)
1) to be justified to belief P on the basis of B one has to be justified to belief B
2) Principle of Inferential Justification:
To be justified in believing P on the basis of E one must not only be (1) justified in believing E, but also (2) justified in believing that E makes probable P.
epistemic regress argument
1) no infinte long chain of justification (B1,2,3,..., F1,2,3,...) possible (no vicious epistemic regress)
conceptual regress argument
Inferential justification: Infallible belief (S's belief that P entails that P is true)
can I believe having a pain without having the pain (or vice versa)?
proposal: noninferential justification lies in truthmaker for the proposition believed
direct acquaintance theory (Russell)
Sellars' objection: there is no "given" element in experience
direct acquaintance presupposes strong correspondence conception of truth
Infinitism (Peter Klein): nothing vicious about the epistemic regress
The problem of the external world
Sense data theory (act-object-theory):
arguments from perceptual relativity (coin), illusion (stick in water), and hallucination (dream)
no experimental difference between veridical and non-veridical experience?
status of sense-data: do they persist in time? do they exist without perceiving? public/private?
problem of dualism
argument from natural science
causal account: perceptual process
the act of perceiving is the perception, the state; no object (external or internal) )is needed
both theories: what we are immediately aware of is never an external object